THE ROLE AND MISSION OF CHAPLAINS IN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND PEACE OPERATIONS (HA/POs)

by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Chaplains can play an important role in humanitarian assistance and peace operations (HA/POs). Operation SEA SIGNAL proved the value of incorporating chaplains into Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Their professional training, their unique expertise, and their military experience made them valuable to the JTF commander and necessary to the success of the mission. The operation also brought to light issues that need to be addressed if chaplains are going to function effectively in future HA/POs. Questions having to do with bodies and billets, tasking and training, and unity of effort all need to be answered for chaplains to function effectively in future operations. Most importantly, these operations provide a new arena for chaplains, but require both commanders and chaplains to think "out of the box," beyond the traditional role and mission of chaplains.

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ABSTRACT

Chaplains can play an important role in humanitarian assistance and peace operations (HA/POs). Operation SEA SIGNAL proved the value of incoporating chaplains into Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Their professional training, their unique expertise, and their military experience made them valuable to the JTF commander and necessary to the success of the mission. The operation also brought to light issues that need to be addressed if chaplains are going to function effectively in future HA/POs. Questions having to do with bodies and billets, tasking and training, and unity of effort all need to be answered for chaplains to function effectively in future operations. Most importantly, these operations provide a new arena for chaplains, but require both commanders and chaplains to think "out of the box," beyond the traditional role and mission of chaplains.

Current readings in military studies indicate that one challenge the military faces is its ability to prepare for both conventional and non-conventional operations. While fewer personnel and resources are available, it must maintain a state of readiness for any and all situations. As combat and combat service support units task organize for each potential mission, it would behoove the chaplain corps of each service to consider their prospective responses. It should be determined if there is a need to expand the role and mission of chaplains. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that not only is adaptation necessary but additional paradigms need to be developed if the service chaplain corps are to function in the new arenas of military operations. New opportunities for ministry within the armed services should be sought out and planned for. Furthermore, if the chaplain corps are willing to adapt their role and mission in support of the anticipated operations and if the commands are willing to examine the best and most efficient use of this valuable resource, then chaplains' involvement may very well prove crucial to the success of these future operations, and most especially humanitarian operations.

Chaplains played a vital role in Operation SEA SIGNAL, the Haitian and Cuban refugee mission in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) in 1994-96. In contributing to the Joint Task Force mission chaplains worked "outside of the box" ministering to the humanitarian and religious needs of 48,000 Haitians and Cubans as well as 8,000 military personnel, a ministry rarely seen in chaplain corps history.* By analyzing these contributions and the non-traditional roles chaplains played in this operation, this paper will raise issues central to the role and mission of chaplains in Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations (HA/POs).

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* One example was during Vietnamese refugee operations on Guam in the 70s. Chaplain Charlie Eis helped to build tent cities and coordinated logistic support for the operation.

A new arena

As the Armed Forces looks for ways to use conventional forces in addressing conflicts requiring unconventional operations and tactics, it finds itself in a predicament similar to that of placing "new wine in old wineskins." Military analyst Adam Siegel explains, "Humanitarian assistance activities have received little attention until recently; the conception was that such activities were not the purpose of military forces and that they simply required the application of traditional military capabilities to a somewhat unusual situation."[1] The military forces now recognize the need to review requirements, missions' capabilities and their approach to training.

Likewise, chaplains find themselves having to establish their role and mission within these kinds of operations. Joint Pub 1-05, *Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations*, highlights the challenge chaplains face. "Because there may be no precise boundary where one condition (peace, conflict, and war) ends and another begins, changes in religious ministry support activities will be more a matter of changing intensity and emphasis. . . ."[2] Although the publication goes on to explain some of the tasks chaplains may be called on to perform, because of the lack of "precise boundaries" for these kind of operations, neither the non-traditional role chaplains will be called on to play nor their mission are clearly defined.

Operation SEA SIGNAL is a case in point. This operation (also referred to as GTMO II) and its predecessor (Operation GTMO, 1992, or GTMO I) found the services' chaplain corps called to provide a new dimension of ministry, ministry in the context of humanitarian relief. At the time there was no policy in place which delineated the role and mission of chaplains in HA/POs. Chaplains, as evidenced from the mission statement, went into this operation applying the old framework of ministry.

The mission was set forth in the following statement:

> The primary JTF religious support mission is to ensure the free exercise of religion for US Forces and other authorized personnel in support of migrant Operation Sea Signal and to provide worship services, pastoral care, and other religious ministrations as appropriate for migrants in US control. The religious support mission is executed by Religious Ministry Support Teams (RMSTs *) consisting of chaplains and enlisted support personnel from Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force organizations.[3]

Their "migrant ministry" began at the planning cell for JTF 160 which was stood up at 2D FSSG, Camp Lejeune, in January-February 1994. Chaplains' involvement continued through the in-processing at sea, the follow-on processing at GTMO, and eached its full height with the care-taking of the refugees. The range and content of the ministry to refugees included "simply clarifying a rumor" when the migrant would trust no other uniformed person, to "helping distribute food and clothing," leading worship services and providing sacramental religious ministry, "intervening in life and death situations as negotiator/counselor" and "everything in between." The September 1994 After Action Report** described the success of the chaplains' ministry: "Pastoral contacts ranged from 15,000 to 20,000 per week. Worship attendance reached about 15,000 people attending one or more services each week. Several hundred migrants and a few US Forces personnel were baptized."[4] Many of the chaplains were on site with just a few days' notice. Their chaplains' kits and sermon notes in hand, most arrived, however, lacking proper indoctrination and training for this kind of mission. In this new arena, chaplains functioned just as they always have, only the faces in the "congregation" had changed.

It just so happened that this traditional approach worked,*** when, in fact, chaplains were

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* Now referred to as Unit Ministry Teams or UMTs.

** This report was not written at the end of the mission but at the time of the JTF Command Chaplain change of office.

*** The conditions for this happenstance will be discussed in the next section.

breaking new ground. The chaplains' mission in this operation was more than religious ministry for the sake of the military member's First Amendment rights and spiritual guidance for the command. Chaplains now had to balance the needs of the service members with the requirements of ministry to migrants. Now providing ministry to non-DoD personnel, chaplains discovered that foreign cultures, language barriers, religious expressions, and ethnic backgrounds brought forth new challenges to their ministry. Functioning in the joint arena, chaplains learned that cooperation with other members of the JTF Staff and communication with chaplains of other services were more important than ever. Logistic chains were lengthened and became more complicated. Cooperation and planning with Civil Affairs, PSYOPs, Mortuary Affairs personnel, Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and Private voluntary Organizations (PVOs) now played a large part in the Command Religious Program.

By rising to these challenges, the chaplains at GTMO contributed to a new paradigm for ministry in non-traditional operations. Operation SEA SIGNAL saw the incorporation of ministry as an integral part of the mission and not simply adjunct to it. Chaplains performed their duties in ways not often considered, directly and actively contributing to the JTF mission. From Phase I, the crisis management phase, UMTs helped to build camps, addressed the basic needs of the migrants, handled supplies, and reunified families. In Phase II, the normalization phase, UMTs not only focused on more "normal" or traditional religious activities, (meeting religious needs and contributing to the mission providing "crowd control" and "time filling") but began to pave the way for the NGOs who would step in during Phase III, the consolidation phase. In GTMO, chaplains' ministry had not only intrinsic value, but unexpected value; chaplains proved their value as tools necessary for the success of the JTF mission, tools as valuable as any other in the CO's tool box.

GTMO as Model

The question arises then, should GTMO serve as the sole model for future Civil Military Operations? Certainly much can be said about the success of the chaplains' able handling of this new situation, successes which should be passed down and repeated in future operations. But there are also some characteristics of this operation which will not be repeated. Future operations may not lend themselves to such "easy" ministry or clear cut contribution to the mission. The following discussion highlights some of the main concerns and questions raised by the GTMO operation. The succeeding section will attempt to address the issues as they apply to future operations.

Availability of chaplains: In Operation SEA SIGNAL, the refugees themselves essentially dictated the great need for chaplains. Haitians and Cubans are primarily (though not entirely) Roman Catholic. Most are very religious. Because of the central role clergy play in the everyday lives of Haitians and Cubans, there was immediate identification with the chaplains as a known and trusted quantity. All the chaplain corps made a concerted attempt to send chaplains representing the faith groups of the migrant community. In spite of the shortage of Roman Catholic priests throughout the military, particular efforts were made to free up as many as possible for duty in GTMO. The goal of one Protestant and one Catholic chaplain in each camp was met by 1 November 1994.[5]

It was at the expense of US base chapel communities (i.e., non-deploying units) that there was adequate chaplain coverage in GTMO. Shuffling chaplains and rearrangement of duty schedules still did not facilitate proper relief to the command from which these chaplains were borrowed. Back filling these duty stations with Reserve chaplains was difficult and slow due to funding and timing constraints. The demand for priests in GTMO combined with the chronic

problem of declining retention and recruitment of priests on active duty severely depleted Catholic coverage stateside. How do we reconcile failing to adequately provide for the religious needs of these service members?

Other potential problems arise when considering the need for faith coverage in areas of operations where Islam or Buddhism is the primary religion. How then do we provide ministry? Right now there are no non-Judeo-Christian chaplains in any of the services with the exception of one Muslim Chaplain Candidate in the Navy Chaplain Candidates' program and one Muslim chaplain active duty in the Army. Will they be always "on call" for any contingency similar to GTMO I/II which might involve Muslim foreign refugees (e.g., past involvement in Bangladesh, Somalia, northern Iraq)? What then about the ministry to the base community or unit? Should Muslim lay leaders be identified, trained and ready for call up to lend their assistance in HA/POs? These questions are of particular relevance when considering our present involvement in the peacekeeping mission in religiously-riven Bosnia.

Numbers: A separate but similar concern has to do with the numbers of chaplains assigned to an operation. Based on the requirements established for GTMO I, the staffing requirement for chaplains was identified at a ratio of one chaplain to every 500 refugees. This goal was later changed to 1:1000 when the number of refugees skyrocketed beyond expectations. Even with the wider ratio, this still meant a great number of chaplains. The majority of UMTs were ordered to GTMO specifically for ministry to the refugees. Some chaplains were deployed as ministers to their units and gave their assistance to the migrant ministry. At the peak there were 48 UMTs on hand, and a total of 150 UMTs for the entire operation. This is a remarkable accomplishment.

This kind of mission raises new challenges for chaplains and provides countless

opportunities for ministry. Yet chaplains have already been fully employed with fundamental tasks such as providing religious ministry, advising the CO, strengthening the moral fiber of the unit, and assisting military members to cope with the situation at hand. While the workload is in itself a concern which will be discussed at some length later, the basic issue of the sheer numbers of chaplains available to handle this workload merits attention. One JTF chaplain raised his concern that UMTs sent TAD to GTMO were not completely released to their JTF duties and were still subject to call up or deployment with their home units.* Supervisory chaplains and UMTs were assigned to the JTF for 90 days, any more would have had a significant and detrimental effect on the command stateside. Difficulties in timing the turnover of UMTs made the number of available assets tentative at best. What if the HA/PO requires the use of even smaller forces or a single service, and therefore fewer chaplains or a smaller pool from which to pull them? If the staffing goal only takes into consideration the military numbers, will these chaplains be able to support anything beyond their primary mission to their own nation's service members? What if there is no way to plan for the numbers of the foreign nationals who will be involved? What if "right-sizing" the military so severely depletes its numbers of chaplains that the staffing goal simply cannot be met?

Building a religious community: A look at the religious program in GTMO raises other questions. How do, how should, and how can chaplains build a religious community? For example, when chaplains arrived on the scene and began establishing their ministry, many chaplains continued sacramental business as usual. If, in the context of a pastoral visit or in worship, refugees made known their desire to be baptized, chaplains readily complied. One of

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*This, in fact, was not the case. Those UMTs which were taken out of the JTF had been released back to their units with permission from CINCLANTFLT. The point remains, however, that some juggling of assets was necessary to ensure coverage both at "home" and in the JTF.

the JTF command chaplains voiced his concern over the misperception on the part of some of the refugees who thought that baptism by an American chaplain was a requirement for (or a guarantee of) US citizenship. This in itself is a problem, but a number of ecclesiastical issues are raised as well. Into what church community have these people been baptized and by what authority are US chaplains endorsed for foreign ministry? Who keeps the baptismal records? What church is now responsible for these new Christians? These may not seem like operational questions, but their importance is made evident when seen in the context of the right for chaplains to perform this kind of ministry to non-military personnel as defined by the First Amendment in the interest of the separation of Church and State.

Language barriers: When the Cubans arrived, the call went out to the chaplain corps for Spanish-speaking chaplains. Within the chaplains' own support element, were many Spanish-speaking chaplains assistants and religious program specialists. Although few chaplains or assistants speak Creole, there were plenty of interpreters gathered from throughout the armed forces for this operation to assist the UMTs in both camps. Language differences therefore did not raise an insurmountable barrier. Chaplains went about their business with little difficulty.*

In the first GTMO operation the need for Creole linguists to serve as translators, interrogators, and communicators exceeded the number of identified linguists in the armed forces.[6] Fortunately, more were identified for the second operation and chaplains were able to benefit from their talents. But if translators are not as readily available, what then? Clearly language limitations are a concern for the success of the operation. One simple but important

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*Within the first week after arrival some chaplains learned to pronounce Creole in order to phonetically sound out the words to Mass. One chaplain learned enough Creole to conduct a funeral service on his own.

question arises: for the sake of fulfilling other requirements will religious ministry be left out?

Civil Affairs (CA), Psychological Operations (PSYOPs), and Intelligence: Then there is the issue of the relationship with CA units, PSYOPs personnel and the J-2 (Intelligence) section. Relations with Civil Affairs were not as smooth as they could and should have been. Chaplains were on the scene early, performing functions of humanitarian relief typical of duties ordinarily performed by CA personnel. When Civil Affairs took over these activities they did not take into consideration the relationship chaplains had established with the migrants. Instead, they went about their own business which resulted in duplication of effort and apparent dismissal of the chaplains' ability and willingness to continue their involvement in the distribution of clothing and food and the establishment of schools, nurseries and community activities. One chaplain started up a school which accommodated 250 children by the time CA arrived. When he was refused pencils and paper from CA, he resorted to purchasing the materials he needed through the Navy Exchange.[7] Supply lines had been diverted in favor of Civil Affairs, which prevented other chaplains from continuing similar projects. Moreover, communication lines between the CA office and the chaplains seemed to go one way. Chaplains expected that CA personnel would provide information about the indigenous religious culture and requirements, which they did -- many times inaccurately. For example, Civil Affairs distributed a pamphlet, without consulting the chaplains, which indicated which days the Haitians observed as religious holy days. The pamphlet confused the Feast of the Assumption (15 August) with the Feast of the Immaculate Conception (8 December). When chaplains attempted to correct the faulty reports, CA ignored their input.[8]

PSYOPs personnel, on the other hand, were cooperative and willing to participate in the exchange of mutual information, passing down pertinent details and welcoming any

reciprocation chaplains could offer. Little information, obviously, could be expected from the J-2 shop because of security issues, but they were eager to hear whatever impressions chaplains had gathered from their involvement with the migrants. There was some confusion about the role chaplains should play in gathering "intelligence," but it was quickly resolved and mutually understood that chaplains could not serve in roles which would detract from their ability to minister to and gain the trust and confidence of the migrant population.

In other civil-military operations CA units have been deployed early on, before unit chaplains or UMTs were ordered in, and the issue of their mutual cooperation has not been raised. Is there anything to be said about the mutuality of their missions? In future operations will CA and PSYOPs see any need for the role chaplains can play? Will they be willing to share in the mission and cooperate accordingly? How should unity of effort be achieved?

Though all operations prove unique unto themselves, Operation SEA SIGNAL's uniqueness raises a myriad of questions of which the operational commander needs to be aware. It brought to light crucial issues that need to be addressed if any future HA/PO missions are to be successful. And even though GTMO should not function as the paradigm, it can be used to show the contributions chaplains can and should make to non-traditional operations. As vital players in the success of Operation SEA SIGNAL, chaplains have proven their willingness to respond to these operations and their ability to adapt their ministerial styles to meet the requirements.

Revamping the Chaplain's Role and Mission

Chaplains have served the armed forces by providing religious support to military members and other authorized personnel for well over 200 years. Chaplains provide for the First Amendment rights for DoD personnel, that is, the right for each person to have the freedom to

exercise his or her religion.[9] In fulfillment of their service, chaplains provide spiritual leadership and religious ministry support to the command as determined by service guidelines, in accordance with appropriate guidance from the commander, and compatible with their ecclesiastical endorsement and noncombatant status. Traditionally, chaplains have been seen in the field, on ships at sea, in base chapels, on the flight line, and in workspaces, providing ministry to military personnel and their families. Counseling, advising, supporting service member at all levels of command, preaching, teaching, and guiding the religious community, are all traditionally part of the chaplain's routine duties.

The acceptance of HA/POs as a valid military mission introduces the need to define and evaluate the chaplain's role and mission within these operations. A draft of Joint Pub 3-07.6 states that "The structure of the JTF should include religious ministry support for the deployed force. Religious ministry support refers to the full spectrum of professional duties to include providing for or facilitating essential religious needs, pastoral care, and programs to enhance morale, moral, and personnel well being." It gives guidelines for planning religious support. This publication speaks clearly to the traditional role chaplains will and should play in HA/POs [10] In addition to providing for divine services and religious expression, chaplains are expected to assist service members in transitioning to the mindset required for the operation. This is especially important given the kinds of situations members of the Armed Forces will face and the direction in which modern day warfare is headed. The service member will require a greater sense of self-awareness and responsibility.

A Norwegian colonel who had been assigned to UN field forces spoke to the unique contribution chaplains can and should make to peacekeeping operations:

[Chaplains should be prepared] to support the peacekeeping soldier. You must

> preserve him [sic] to survive not only as soldier, but as human being. He must resist losing his neutrality, his impartiality. You must preserve his buffer function. You must remind him of the base wall for what he is doing. You will have to contribute in order to make him continue to negotiate, even with a human beast surrounded by an atmosphere of brutalism [sic] and cruelty. He has to face it, the evil effects of war... with no safety net.
>
> Preserve him. Protect him so that he does not turn to a beast himself, by being present in brutal and cynical environments. Let him not be infected, and taking part, being on the one side. Because then he is not a peacekeeper any more.[11]

Some operations find the service members' eyes opened to shocking sights and situations. In his Army Command and Staff College thesis, Army Chaplain Gary Councell explains that chaplains can help service members deal with the disturbing reality of the mission.

> "Soldiers arriving on a disaster scene are often not as prepared for the situational shock as they might think they are. The calamity, chaos, and confusion, lack of customary amenities, filth, stench, human misery, and death can be quite debilitating emotionally. UMTs can help diffuse initial reactions, reduce stress, and help soldiers maintain purpose."[12]

Consider also the higher standard of moral integrity to which these service members are called to uphold in these operations. With the decentralization of command responsibilities inherent in these kinds of operations, the individual lower-ranking Sailor, Soldier, Airman, and Marine will be called on to make more and more decisions on his or her own, decisions with great social and cultural impact, and crucial to the success of the mission. By virtue of the nature of HA/POs, and the kind of direct humanitarian aid required, service members will be closely involved with the foreign civilian community. Joint Pub 3-07.3 has taken into consideration the impact this involvement could have on an operation: "These personnel must understand . . . the local customs, religions, tribal factions, in order to avoid confrontations with the local populace.[13] Preparation, both emotional and spiritual, is well within chaplains' professional purview. They are uniquely qualified to assist, guide and counsel the

servicemember in playing their parts in these operations.

It is the nature of these operations that brings to light the less traditional, but nonetheless critical, role chaplains should and will play. In underdeveloped countries, where HA/POs most often take place, religion, more often than not, occupies a significant place in political and military affairs. Van Creveld, an expert in military analysis, claims that this symbiotic relationship will become even more evident in the future. "From the vantage point of the present, there appears every prospect that religious attitudes, beliefs, and fanaticisms will play a larger role in the motivation of armed conflict than it has, in the West at any rate, for the last 300 years."[14] Another authority on this subject, Samuel Huntington, suggests in his article "The Clash of Civilizations?", that as civilizations polarize, their cultural identities become more distinct. In the course of carving out these identities, cultural differences -- language, customs, and religions, to name a few -- will become more and more important. The growth and fervor of religious fundamentalist movements within civilizations worldwide is proof.

> "As people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they are likely to see an 'us' versus 'them' relation existing between themselves and people of different ethnicity or religion.... Differences in culture and religion create differences over policy issues, ranging from human rights to immigration to trade and commerce to the environment. . . . Decreasingly able to mobilize support and form coalitions on the basis of ideology, governments and groups will increasingly attempt to mobilize support by appealing to common religion and civilization identity.[15]

Many service members have no idea what makes up the culture into which they will be placed nor how different it may be from their own. Robert Kaplan, writing for *The Atlantic Monthly*, shared a story which provides an illustration of the chasm that separates us. "Here in West Africa we have a lot of superficial Islam and superficial Christianity. Western religion is undermined by *animist beliefs not suitable to a moral society*, because they are based on irrational spirit power. Here spirits are used to wreak vengeance by one person against another,

or one group against another."[16] (emphasis added) Acknowledging the cultural differences may be the first step toward a successful mission.

The cultural learning curve will be steep, and education will be extremely valuable. Even before the mission chaplains can and should serve as educators, even subject matter experts, on the religious, ethnic, and cultural dimensions of the operation. As the situation develops, chaplains should be expected to contribute to its evaluation, to determine the extent to which religion will be a factor. As stated in Joint Pub 1-05, chaplains should "research and interpret cultural and religious factors pertinent to a given area of operations. Work with Civil Affairs personnel in analyzing local religious organizations, customs and practices, doctrines, symbols, and the significance of shrines and holy places. Prepare area assessments and estimates of the local religious situation."[17] This could prove to have a tremendous impact on the mission by providing the commander information vital for the decision-making process and "battlefield awareness". The information that chaplains bring to the table can, in fact, contribute directly to the success of the mission. Chaplains' interaction with the community may elicit their tolerance, cooperation and support, all of which could very well prove vital to the operation.

CA and PSYOPs have a responsibility to inform the commander of the current cultural situation and to help the indigenous population understand and support the operation. The effectiveness of these units also depends on their ability to take advantage of all the assets available to them, to include the chaplain's expertise. The following three examples demonstrate the significant assistance chaplains can provide.

During Desert Storm chaplains would go out to the middle eastern churches to coordinate food distribution and assistance. Their visits yielded vital cultural information, such as the expectations Muslims had of the Americans, and clarification on the differences between

the Islamic and Judeo-Christian manners and customs. The human intelligence (HUMINT), gleaned from these conversations proved to be valuable not only culturally but tactically; for example, some chaplains learned from their middle eastern counterparts, where the Iraqi secret police were operating. Certainly CA personnel were capable of gathering this same information, but consider how easily it was obtained by the chaplains, simply because of their religious "connections."

After the war, Americans turned their attention to the Kurds, providing them food and blankets. When the humanitarian assistance was completed, the Kurds turned on the Americans. Why? One theory is based on the possibility that when the Americans distributed food which included pork products, they had unknowingly offended the Muslim community. [18] One can only speculate but perhaps chaplain involvement in the CA information gathering for this operation might have provided them a more thorough understanding of the religious culture and prevented this crucial mistake.

The Commandant of the United States Coast Guard shares a story from his visit to the Haitian migrant camp. The Haitian refugees would not draw water from the water buffaloes (large water tanks on wheels), because, to them, the tanks looked like receptacles used in Haiti for human sewage. "Try as they might, the Americans could not get the Haitians to drink the fresh water. Then seeing the problem, one of our chaplains slowly walked to the tank, blessed it with the sign of the cross, drank from it himself, and soon all the Haitians were using it."[19] The role the chaplain played in this scene gives evidence to the chaplain's unique ability to diffuse potentially upsetting situations.

When considering the role chaplains can play in HA/POs, the commander should recognize that chaplains can provide valuable information. Clarifying a point made earlier,

however, it should not be interpreted or extrapolated from these examples that chaplains can be used as intelligence agents. As in Operation SEA SIGNAL, one must not expect that chaplains will violate any confidence entrusted to them because of their office. The rules of confidentiality still stand. Chaplains often receive special trust and confidence, beyond the priest-penitent relationship, by virtue of their clerical status. This should not be exploited for the sake of intelligence gathering. The point here has to do with observations made and information gathered in casual conversation, perhaps more easily obtained by chaplains because of their approachability and "non-threatening" role. Chaplains, too, must recognize the importance of the responsibility laid on them both ecclesiastically and militarily. They should well understand, from the very beginning of their careers, that they will be called on to discern that which is said in confidence, that which is disclosed in good faith, and that which is not.

Having made that distinction, it should be clear that the chaplains, as experts in the field, can be valuable assets. Given the likelihood that religion will be a critical factor in civil-military operations, chaplains, by expanding their role and mission to include less traditional activities, can offer unique support to these missions. Chaplains can assist the command to assess the situation, to address some of the critical factors inherent in these operations, and to face the challenges that lie ahead.

Some Considerations

Anticipating the contributions chaplains can make to future HA/POs, and in answer to some of the issues raised in the analysis of Operation SEA SIGNAL, three variables come to the fore: integration, tasking, and training. Each will prove crucial to the chaplain corps' ability to effectively support any mission.

Integration: Government and non-government agencies are preparing for contingencies

with their planning sessions and seminar war games long before any situations arise. Chaplains need to be invited and involved at this higher level. Participation in interagency discussions on HA/POs, which involve government agencies, NGOs, PVOs and United Nations response teams, provides opportunity for mutual exchange of ideas and food for further thought. Each player gains a greater awareness of the talents and resources which can be brought to an operation.

As situations develop, this prior commitment to interoperability will prove valuable as time lines, limitations, desired end states and strategic objectives are determined and later implemented. In cooperation with NGOs and PVOs, chaplains can indeed build religious communities, by setting the stage for long-term ministry which would fall under the auspices of the organizations designed and authorized to perform these functions. In turning over the responsibilities for the communities as early as possible, military chaplains would then be protected from stepping over their ecclesiastical and legal boundaries. Likewise, if chaplains are some of the first of these groups on site as in GTMO, having been made aware of the total picture, they will not find themselves at cross purposes with these agencies. In short, interoperability at the earliest stages will result in a cleaner, more efficient operation.

Tasking: If chaplains are going to provide this combination of traditional ministry while at the same time making creative and constructive contributions within these new situations, they run the risk of attempting to be all things to all people in all situations. Additionally, there is the practical concern of limited resources available to chaplains in this era of budget cuts and force reductions. With scarce resources and a full platter, how will chaplains meet mission requirements?

Training the Reserve component in the UMT concept might be an answer to this question and those raised earlier regarding the availability and numbers of chaplains. As

evidenced by Operation SEA SIGNAL, HAs can require a significant number of UMTs. If UMTs were mobilized from the Reserve community, unit chaplains could remain with their units, and reservists could contribute primarily to the HA requirements. Because these operations are so different from "typical" military operations, the reservists' civilian experience might facilitate recognition of the unique needs of the foreign civilian community. Preparing to meet these requirements would be part of the Reserve training syllabus, and more will be said on this subject later.

The mobilization of the Reserve chaplain community raises other issues. Because establishing relationships and becoming an integral part of the system is vital to ministry effectiveness, a call up of 90 days is likely to be the workable minimum. Reserve chaplains who can deploy for 90 or more days, without fear of losing their jobs or causing their home parishes to dissolve, would need to be identified, perhaps by a billet sequencing code or other administrative identification. The administrative roadblocks which prevent willing and able reservists from serving at least 90 days would need to be cleared. Budgets would need to be prepared to withstand these unusual mobilization requirements.

Training: The goal is to prepare chaplains to be able to support the JTF mission with operational expertise. Emphasis in training should be centered around the chaplain's primary mission which is to provide ministry and pastoral care. Attention should also be given to the setting in which this ministry will take place. Indoctrination, specific to the operation at hand and prior to deployment, should be incorporated into the planning cycle and implemented.

Efforts must be made even before a situation erupts. While not every contingency can be known or planned for, care should be given to considering the possibilities which might be faced. Much like the OPLANs set in place for certain areas of operations worldwide,

preparatory consideration should also be given to the cultural, ideological, and religious factors in a given region. Force level chaplains should facilitate frequent training on the religious considerations in their areas of responsibility. Training exercises, seminar gaming, deliberate planning-type conferences, proactive research projects on regional contingencies, and current information on the hot spots within the region, should be conducted to determine what might possibly be required. What are the dietary rules? Where are the religious structures and burial grounds? What are the various religions represented in that region? What would the religious requirements be for enemy prisoners of war? What NGOs, PVOs, or other humanitarian relief agencies are already in place, what others could be contacted? These kinds of questions should be answered well in advance. If they were, chaplains serving in the operating forces would be prepared to inform their commander on factors which could impact the mission.

Given the well-spring of expertise in the Reserve chaplain community, gathering this kind of information would be simply a matter of tapping these sources. Many Reserve chaplains are intimately involved in civilian agencies as part of their civilian work. Others serve as professors or in similar positions which give them a vast working knowledge of the latest studies and pertinent information available. Professors or subject matter experts in the local community from universities, community colleges, or relief organizations, could also be called on to share information and conduct training.

Because Civil Affairs units in both the Army and the Marine Corps come primarily from the Reserve community, it might be worth considering incorporating chaplains billets into those unit structures. Reserve chaplains could contribute to the Civil Affairs training (having, of course, themselves been trained) as the religious experts for the various contingencies for which that unit plans or trains. If embedded billets were not funded, it might be mutually beneficial

to incorporate chaplains into their training cycle and vice versa. For the chaplains, awareness of the Civil Affairs mission, constraints and concerns would help them understand their role and mission within the larger picture. For Civil Affairs personnel, more exposure to chaplains would perhaps encourage them to rely more on the contributions chaplains make. This, of course, would be equally beneficial within the active duty arena as well. It is worth noting that in terms of both tasking and training, the Reserve community would play a major, though not exclusive, part, thus affirming the necessity of total force planning and cooperation.

Conclusion

As the Armed Forces respond to the new demands placed on them as they engage in civil military operations, it should not overlook the contributions chaplains can make particularly to humanitarian assistance and peace operations. As illustrated in this paper, chaplains, by virtue of their profession, education, and position, bring unique talents to the table. By incorporating chaplains into the planning cycle, interagency discussions, and mission design, the mission commanders will discover the significant impact they can have.

For this to be beneficial, issues such as those raised in the analysis of Operation SEA SIGNAL must be studied and addressed. While it is important that this example of the successful use of chaplains in this operation not be overlooked, both accomplishments and shortcomings must be analyzed in detail. Further considerations such as integration, tasking, and training must be given careful attention to enable the effective incorporation of chaplains into an operation. One question remains: are commanders and service chaplain corps willing to revamp the role and mission of chaplains to integrate them most effectively into humanitarian assistance and peace operations? The success of these operations may very well depend on the answer.

1. Adam B. Siegel, *Requirements for Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations: Insights from Seven Case Studies* (Virginia: Center for Naval Analyses, March 1995) p. 11

2. Joint Pub 1-05, *Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations*, 03 August 1993, p. I-1,2

3. Command Chaplain After Action Report, to Brigadier General M. J. Williams, USMC, CG, JTF 160, GTMO, 29 Sep 94. para. 3.

4. ibid., para. 8.a.

5. "Quality of Life" JTF Chaplain's Report to Chief of Staff, JTF 160, GTMO, 05 Nov 94, para. 1.

6. Siegel, p. 24.

7. Telephone conversation with Chaplain Lou Iasello, CDR, CHC, USN, 1 February 1996, .

8. ibid.

9. Title 10, United States Code, §3073, §5142, and §8067

10. Joint Pub 3-07.6, Draft, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations*," 12 June 1995, p. IV-19.

11. Colonel Tor Löset, "How Do Chaplains Minister in Peace Operations?" speech, Warsaw Poland, 7 February 1995.

12. Gary R. Councell, CH(COL), USA, *Chaplain Roles in Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Operations*, (Defense Technical Information Center, VA: April 1994), p. 35

13. Joint Pub 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations*, 29 April 1994, p. IV-1.

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17. Joint Pub 1-05, August 1993, para 2.b.(3), p. 1-4.

18. Telephone conversation with E. F. Blancett, CAPT, CHC, USN, 16 January 1996.

19. Quoted by RADM Donald K. Muchow, CHC, USN, in "Chaplain: A Representative of God," *The Navy Chaplain*, Vol. 9, No. 3, p. 6.

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